Health Insurance Benefit Mandates and Firm Size Distribution
James Bailey () and
Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2018, vol. 85, issue 2, 577-595
By 2010, the average U.S. state had passed 37 health insurance benefit mandates (laws requiring health insurance plans to cover certain additional services). Previous work has shown that these mandates likely increase health insurance premiums, which in turn could make it more costly for firms to compensate employees. Using 1996â€“2010 data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages and a novel instrumental variables strategy, we show that there is limited evidence that mandates reduce employment. However, we find that mandates lead to a distortion in firm size, benefiting larger firms that are able to selfâ€ insure and thus exempt themselves from these stateâ€ level health insurance regulations. This distortion in firm size away from small businesses may lead to substantial decreases in productivity and economic growth.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Health Insurance Benefit Mandates and the Firm-Size Distribution (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:85:y:2018:i:2:p:577-595
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Risk & Insurance is currently edited by Keith Crocker
More articles in Journal of Risk & Insurance from The American Risk and Insurance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().