WHAT DRIVES TORT REFORM LEGISLATION? AN ANALYSIS OF STATE DECISIONS TO RESTRICT LIABILITY TORTS

Yiling Deng and George Zanjani

Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2018, vol. 85, issue 4, 959-991

Abstract: This article studies the timing of state‐level tort reform enactments between 1971 and 2005. Using discrete‐time hazard models, we find the level of litigation activity—as measured by incurred liability insurance losses, the number of lawyers, and tort cases commenced—to be the most important and robust determinant of tort reform adoption. Political‐institutional factors and regional effects—such as Republican control of the state government, single‐party control of the legislature and governorship, and a (relatively) conservative political ideology among a state's Democrats—are also associated with quicker reform adoption.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12186

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:85:y:2018:i:4:p:959-991

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.wiley.com/bw/subs.asp?ref=0022-4367

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Risk & Insurance is currently edited by Joan T. Schmit

More articles in Journal of Risk & Insurance from The American Risk and Insurance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().