Do insurers use internal capital markets to manage regulatory scrutiny risk?
Stephen G. Fier and
Andre P. Liebenberg
Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2023, vol. 90, issue 4, 861-897
Abstract:
Empirical evidence suggests that insurance groups allocate capital to members with better performance or growth prospects and use internal capital markets (ICMs) to protect the franchise value of less capitalized members. We propose and test an additional motivation for the use of ICMs—to manage regulatory scrutiny risk. We show that almost 50% of insurers at risk of facing additional regulatory scrutiny due to failing four Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios received sufficient internal capital to avoid enhanced regulation. Moreover, the likelihood and extent of internal capital allocation are related to regulatory scrutiny risk and the amount of capital allocated is typically just enough to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Time series evidence indicates that groups manage regulatory scrutiny risk by allocating capital toward affiliates when their pre‐capital contribution IRIS ratio failures exceed three, and away from affiliates when they are no longer at risk of additional regulatory scrutiny.
Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12438
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:90:y:2023:i:4:p:861-897
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