MARKTMACHT, GEWERKSCHAFTEN UND LOHNHÖHE IN DER INDUSTRIE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSGHLAND

Manfred Neumann, Ingo Böbel and Alfred Haid

Kyklos, 1980, vol. 33, issue 2, 230-245

Abstract: Interindustrial wage differences in West Germany are explained by trade unions’ pressure (unionism, strike intensity), sellers’ market power (concentration, profits, vertical integration, cartels, and international trade), and fluctuations among labour force. The inverse relationship between concentration and wages can, theoretically, be traced back to monopoly and it is suggested that concentration should primarily be considered as an indicator of monopoly power. Vertical integration of successive stages of production within a single firm appears to entail efficiency gains on balance whereas in the case of cartels of the kind permitted in West Germany, monopolizing and efficiency raising effects appear to just cancel.

Date: 1980
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