WORK‐SHARING AND INSURANCE POLICY: A CURE FOR STAGFLATION

Felix R. FitzRoy

Kyklos, 1981, vol. 34, issue 3, 432-447

Abstract: A new microeconomic approach to the otherwise intractable problems of stagflation is developed. If social security contributions were proportional to hours worked, and if unemployment insurance were primarily supplied by firms, these will have an incentive to reduce hours rather than number of employees during recession, when long spells of unemployment are to be expected, with consequent high insurance costs to the firm. Such work‐sharing would encourage wage and price restraint as all workers gain from returning to normal hours when the utility of extra leisure begins to decline. Reduction of the work force would take place when new jobs can be found quickly and social costs are minimized.

Date: 1981
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1981.tb01198.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:34:y:1981:i:3:p:432-447

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0023-5962

Access Statistics for this article

Kyklos is currently edited by Rene L. Frey

More articles in Kyklos from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().