The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest‐Group Approach

Torsten Amelung

Kyklos, 1989, vol. 42, issue 4, 515-532

Abstract: The political economy of protection attributes the erection of trade barriers to interest group activities, preferences of the electorates and nationalist ideologies on part of the politicians. The respective empirical models, which have already been confirmed for a number of industrialized countries, are also applicable for developing and newly industrializing countries. However, as the survey of empirical studies on these countries shows, the explanatory power of these models is quite low. For this reason, this paper develops an extended interest‐group approach, which also includes suppliers and purchasers which might form an opposition against the increasing protection. The empirical evidence for the case of Brazil shows that this extended interest group model substantially improves the results of the estimations.

Date: 1989
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