Choosing Not To Choose: When Politicians Choose To Delegate Powers

Stefan Voigt and Eli M. Salzberger

Kyklos, 2002, vol. 55, issue 2, 289-310

Abstract: A first draft of this paper was written while the authors were with the Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin. They would like to thank its staff for its immense hospitality and Dieter Grimm, Larry Lessig, Rico Maggi, Dieter Sadowski, and Janes Sustersic for illuminating discussions of some of the ideas contained in this paper.

Date: 2002
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