A Note on Friedman and the Neo-Bayesian Approach

Gianluigi Pelloni

The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, 1987, vol. 55, issue 4, 407-18

Abstract: The literature dealing with Milton Friedman's methodological framework tends to overlook his adhere nce to the neo-Bayesian interpretation of probability theory. In this note, it is shown that Friedman's probabilistic framework has deep i mplications for his notion of rationality and treatment of expectatio ns, and that disregarding this feature of his analytical toolkit lead s to arguments which are factually wrong and misleading. R. E. Lucas' s and Friedman's methodological approaches are then contrasted in ter ms of their probabilistic underpinnings. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manch2:v:55:y:1987:i:4:p:407-18

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