The Impact of Tariffs and Quotas on Collusion in International Cartels

Robert Rothschild

The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, 1990, vol. 58, issue 2, 105-19

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of trade restrictions on firms' capacity to maintain collusive agreements in an international "dominant group" cartel. The author shows, in particular, how tariffs and quotas can have different effects on the stability of these arrangements according to the composition of the cartel. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manch2:v:58:y:1990:i:2:p:105-19

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