Optimal Job Acceptance When the Wage Offer Distribution Is Unknown

Simon Burgess ()

The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, 1992, vol. 60, issue 2, 181-86

Abstract: Conventional search models lose much of their elegance and power if the distribution of wage offers is unknown. Many of the results of search theory do not go through in models requiring learning rules. In contrast, the paper shows that, in a model of on-the-job search with an unknown offer distribution, individuals make optimal job acceptance/rejection decisions. The result essentially arises because, in a model permitting employed search, the job acceptance decision is separated from the decision to continue or terminate search. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manch2:v:60:y:1992:i:2:p:181-86

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