Preference Motivations and Libertarian Dilemmas

S Subramanian

The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, 1995, vol. 63, issue 2, 167-74

Abstract: It has often been claimed that libertarian paradoxes in social choice theory can be resolved by enriching the informational basis of social decisions through the inclusion of elements of nonutility information, like preference motivations, in the domain of the aggregation mechanism. It is argued in this note that this project of conflict-resolution does not always yield encouraging results. In particular, there are sensible ways of taking account of preference motivations that fail to yield a way out of Gibbard-type libertarian dilemmas. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

Date: 1995
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