Changing Partners: The Importance of Coordinating Fiscal and Monetary Policies within a Monetary Union

Andrew Hughes Hallett and Yue Ma

The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, 1996, vol. 64, issue 2, 115-34

Abstract: This paper examines and compares the costs of noncooperative (i.e., national) fiscal policies in a monetary union, with the costs of assigning monetary policy to price stability and fiscal policy to output growth as recommended in the Maastricht Treaty. Compared to a fully coordinated monetary union, the authors find that national fiscal policies cause problems in the face of asymmetries between countries but few problems for symmetric (converged) economies. The fiscal-monetary assignments cause problems in either case but paradoxically greater problems appear in the symmetric rather than asymmetric case. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manch2:v:64:y:1996:i:2:p:115-34

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