Evaluating the Concessionality of Tied Aid

Oliver Morrissey and Howard White

The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, 1996, vol. 64, issue 2, 208-26

Abstract: The failure of aid to have a demonstrably positive impact on recipient growth is partly due to donor aid policies, in particular tying, which can have a number of negative effects on recipients. This problem is especially acute for mixed credits, where a contract is financed through a commercial package with an aid subsidy. This paper develops a simple analytical framework for valuing the grant element in aid and mixed credits, accounting directly for excess prices due to tying and also allowing for the relative benefit of aid versus exports as a source of foreign exchange for developing countries. The empirical usefulness of the approach is demonstrated by valuing the concessionality in British mixed credits over the period 1988-92. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Evaluating the Concessionality of Tied Aid (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manch2:v:64:y:1996:i:2:p:208-26

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().