Economics at your fingertips  

Partisan Business and Budget Cycles with Separate Fiscal and Monetary Authorities

Gulcin Ozkan

The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, 1998, vol. 66, issue 2, 178-95

Abstract: This paper studies partisan business and budget cycles in a setup where only fiscal policy is under the full control of the elected government, while an independent central bank makes monetary policy decisions. The government and the central bank are therefore engaged in a non-cooperative game. It is shown that a leftist government produces higher inflation, but contrary to the earlier results, lower output than a rightist government in all election and non-election periods. A leftist government also tax and spend more than a rightist government. The model produces both partisan business and budget cycles due to the timing of elections. Partisan budget cycles are a novel concept and are analyses of post-election fiscal movements as opposed to the pre-election analyses in political budget cycles literature. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Page updated 2020-06-27
Handle: RePEc:bla:manch2:v:66:y:1998:i:2:p:178-95