On the Existence of Linear Equilibria in Models of Market Making

Mark Bagnoli, S Viswanathan () and Craig Holden

Mathematical Finance, 2001, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-31

Abstract: We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a linear equilibrium in three types of competitive market making models: Kyle type models (when market makers only observe aggregate net order flow), Glosten–Milgrom and Easley–O'Hara type models (when market makers observe and trade one order at a time), and call markets models (individual order models when market makers observe a number of orders before pricing and executing any of them). We study two cases: when privately informed (strategic) traders are symmetrically informed and when they have differential information. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the distributions of the random variables for a linear equilibrium. We also explore those features of the equilibrium that depend on linearity as opposed to the particular distributional assumptions and we provide a large number of examples of linear equilibria for each of the models.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9965.00106

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:mathfi:v:11:y:2001:i:1:p:1-31

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0960-1627

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Finance is currently edited by Jerome Detemple

More articles in Mathematical Finance from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().