Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting

Lijia Tan and Lijia Wei

Pacific Economic Review, 2014, vol. 19, issue 3, 313-331

Abstract: We experimentally investigate the evolution play in an infinitely repeated voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We find that in infinitely repeated VCM games: (i) average contributions in the first round are similar to those of finitely repeated VCM games; (ii) most groups have a non-monotonic trend of contribution with repetition; and (iii) contributions remain at the same level after an unexpected restart. The data provides strong support for heterogeneous subjects, which may explain the non-monotonic trend of average contributions. This trend is caused by one category of subjects who expect others to contribute in period t as they did in period t − 1.

Date: 2014
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