Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting

Yen Kuo and Joseph Wang

Pacific Economic Review, 2014, vol. 19, issue 3, 387-400

Abstract: We use the strategy method to conduct laboratory experiments on a nine-player heterogeneous-cost voting game. We replicate the underdog and competition effect, but find significantly higher voter turnout rates to be only partially explained by logit quantal response equilibrium. We examine round-by-round changes in cut-off behaviour and find that voters are highly responsive to historical pivotal events. Voters also respond to past winning and tying, but only as a minority (upsetting the majority), demonstrating an ‘underdog winning effect’, receiving extra utility when winning as a minority. An equilibrium with such asymmetry in utility explains the high minority turnout (and high majority turnout as a best response).

Date: 2014
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