GAME‐THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CHINA's WTO ACCESSION

Eric Bond, Stephen Ching and Edwin L.‐C. Lai

Pacific Economic Review, 2003, vol. 8, issue 2, 117-125

Abstract: Abstract. This paper studies the determination of split of total surplus among the negotiating parties (member countries and the acceding country) in a WTO accession negotiation using a sequential bargaining model. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the most‐favored‐nation (MFN) principle on the negotiation outcome. The MFN principle says that any tariff reduction offered by the applicant for accession has to be automatically granted to all existing members. The model suggests that it is quite plausible that China's share of surplus is more when MFN is in place.

Date: 2003
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