Kontinuitäten und Diskontinuitäten in Entscheidungsprozessen über föderale Finanzbeziehungen oder: Die ewig Unvollendete

Wolfgang Renzsch

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2010, vol. 11, issue 3, 288-306

Abstract: Abstract: The system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Federal Republic of Germany has been always extremely difficult to regulate. The Parliamentary Council of 1948/49 left this task unfinished, and the first fiscal reform of 1955 was only partly successful. The 1969 reform seemed to be more successful, but it became clear quite soon that intensified interlocking politics created new problems for the decision‐making process. Also, it created incentives to finance public policies by debts. The financing of German unity was based on the 1969 regulations. In recent years the overburdening of the existing rules became obvious. Growing problems caused a shift of paradigm in the direction of less interlocking politics and financing.

Date: 2010
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2516.2010.00338.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:perwir:v:11:y:2010:i:3:p:288-306

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1465-6493

Access Statistics for this article

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik is currently edited by Lars P. Feld, J¸rgen von Hagen, Bernd Rudolph and Achim Wambach

More articles in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik from Verein für Socialpolitik Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().