Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence

Wallace Oates

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2002, vol. 3, issue 4, 377-390

Abstract: This paper reviews first the theoretical literature and then the empirical studies of interjurisdictional competition among governments. Of central interest is the normative question of whether fiscal and regulatory competition promotes a more efficient functioning of the public sector or whether it is the source of distortions in the public and private sectors. This is a contentious issue; both the theoretical and empirical literature, while providing some rich insights into the potential impact of such competition, do not give us an unambiguous answer to the general normative question. The concluding section offers the author’s thoughts on all this with a leaning towards the view that such competition is, on balance, efficiency–enhancing.

Date: 2002
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2516.00100

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Chapter: Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence (2004)
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