Bilanzskandale ‐ Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse

Christian Müller

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2004, vol. 5, issue 2, 211-225

Abstract: Abstract: In this paper, recent accounting scandals in Germany are traced back to a serious incentive problem in German auditing law. Since the auditor depends economically on his client, contrary to the legislator's intention, a factual forcing contract is established which enables the client to control his auditor's performance almost completely. As a solution to this problem the proposal of a Demsetz auction of the auditing monopoly is developed, including a mandatory rotation of auditing firms. I shall argue that this proposal not only alleviates the problem of auditing fraud in an incentive‐compatible way but may also serve as an effective barrier against concentration in the auditing market.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2516.2004.00148.x

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