Verdrängungspreise auf Telekommunikationsmärkten?

Justus Haucap and Jörn Kruse

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2004, vol. 5, issue 3, 337-361

Abstract: Abstract: The main argument commonly put forward against retail price deregulation in Germany's telecommunications markets is the concern that otherwise the former monopoly supplier may engage in predatory pricing. And even though some game theoretic models show that predation is sometimes possible, this paper argues that predatory pricing will generally not be profitable. However, prices below average cost and even below marginal cost may be part of a profit‐maximizing business strategy without any predatory intent. Therefore, it is often difficult in practice to distinguish between predatory, anti‐competitive price cuts and normal, competitive pricing policies. Consequently, a regulatory policy which requires incumbents to obtain regulatory authorization for all price cuts is not adequate. Ex‐ante regulation of retail prices, as currently practised in many telecommunications markets, is the least satisfying approach. Similarly, the price squeeze tests that have been recently suggested by various European regulators have their limitations, as they tend to be over‐inclusive. Instead concerns about predatory pricing in telecommunications should, as is the case in almost all other sectors of the economy, be addressed by ex‐post supervision through general competition authorities.

Date: 2004
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