Structuring Europe: Powersharing Institutions and British Preferences on European Integration

Mark Aspinwall

Political Studies, 2000, vol. 48, issue 3, 415-442

Abstract: Scholars examining British‐European relations typically ascribe UK governmental positions firstly to a combination of distinct and incompatible values, attitudes, and beliefs stemming from historical experience; secondly to a distinct and incompatible set of functional imperatives – namely less interaction with European partners than is the case for other EU member states; and third a distinct and incompatible set of domestic interests. This article challenges these views. It presents evidence to suggest that British governments have failed to assimilate social demands, and that the reason is an under‐recognized and untheorized intervening variable – namely the structure of decisionmaking institutions in Parliament. It models the influence of this variable, and suggests that historical institutionalist theory captures key elements of the variable in a manner superior to extant approaches.

Date: 2000
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