Moral Pluralism, Political Justification and Deliberative Democracy

Ian Chowcat

Political Studies, 2000, vol. 48, issue 4, 745-758

Abstract: We can make progress in political justification if we avoid debates about the extent of moral pluralism. Just by having a political view we are committed to its realization but also to its defence upon justifying grounds. It would be inconsistent to seek to realize my view in ways that undermined my ability to justify it. Yet justifying a view implies that I am open to challenges to it, and that perpetually draws me potentially into dialogue with all others, regardless of my will, and into structures which allow an inclusive dialogue to take place, with decisions being made, on the basis of open public discussion, with which I may disagree. Thus a form of deliberative democracy, probably with representative institutions, is justified, without any normative assumptions being made.

Date: 2000
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