Why Is there So Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule Elections?

André Blais

Political Studies, 2002, vol. 50, issue 3, 445-454

Abstract: Using the 1988 Canadian Election Study I examine why there was only restricted strategic voting in single‐member district plurality elections. In that election 19 percent of Canadian voters preferred the party that actually finished third in their constituency, but among these third party supporters only one in eight decided to vote strategically for one of the top two contenders. Strategic voting was relatively rare for two key reasons. First, many third party supporters had a strong preference for their party over all others and were therefore reluctant to rally to either of the top two contenders. Second, many overestimated their party's chance of winning and as a consequence did not feel that their vote would be wasted.

Date: 2002
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