Contractualism and Liberal Neutrality: A Defence

Steven A. Lecce

Political Studies, 2003, vol. 51, issue 3, 524-541

Abstract: The most influential contemporary defences of liberal neutrality are premised on a contractual view of political legitimacy. For contractualists, perfectionist principles of justice are illegitimate because they cannot be the object of reasonable agreement among free and equal citizens. Several critics have challenged this connection between contractualism and neutrality by suggesting that the epistemic arguments commonly offered in its favour are self‐defeating. This paper examines three recent expressions of this claim – those of Simon Caney, Simon Clarke and Joseph Chan – and finds that none of them succeeds. They fail because they mistake an ethical claim about how states should respond to disagreement for an epistemic one that explains why such a response is needed.

Date: 2003
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