Fair‐Play Obligations

Daniel McDermott

Political Studies, 2004, vol. 52, issue 2, 216-232

Abstract: The fair‐play theory of political obligation holds that citizens incur obligations to obey the law as a result of gaining important benefits from their political communities. In this essay, I argue that the fair‐play theory fails in large part because it relies on a flawed understanding of the way in which free‐riding is morally wrong. Starting with the assumption that those who benefit from the efforts of others have a moral reason to reciprocate, at least under some circumstances, I show that the fair‐play theorists’ claim that this reason is grounded in a right to reciprocation, which the providers gain, does not succeed. Therefore this theory cannot provide an adequate explanation of how citizens incur political obligations.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00476.x

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