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Deliberative Democracy, the Public Interest and the Consociational Model

Ian O'Flynn

Political Studies, 2010, vol. 58, issue 3, 572-589

Abstract: One of the most basic charges levelled at the consociational model is that, although it may provide for conflict management, it fails to provide for the longer‐term goal of conflict resolution. This article seeks to respond to this charge by viewing the consociational model through a deliberative democratic lens. In particular, I argue that deliberative democracy provides normative standards that can inform the design of consociational institutions in ways that encourage political leaders to focus on the interests of everyone in society, rather than merely on the interests of their own ethnic group. In so far as consociational institutions, deliberatively conceived, can have this effect, there is in principle no reason why they might not also provide for conflict resolution.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00795.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:polstu:v:58:y:2010:i:3:p:572-589

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