Political Institutions and the Distributional Consequences of Suffrage Extension

Tarik Abou-Chadi and Matthias Orlowski

Political Studies, 2015, vol. 63, 55-72

Abstract: type="main">

In this article, it is demonstrated that suffrage extension positively affects public goods provision and redistribution. This effect, however, depends on the political-institutional context within countries – namely the electoral system and the existence of veto points. Since they incentivise more targeted spending, majoritarian systems decrease the positive effect that suffrage extension has on public goods provision. The relocation of the median voter through suffrage extension does not lead to more redistribution where second chambers with veto rights reduce the power of the working class to induce policy change. Empirical support is provided for this argument by analysing the conditional effects of suffrage extension through difference-in-difference estimation utilising data on government spending and inheritance taxation in eleven Western European countries between 1880 and 1938. These findings emphasise the importance of taking into account political institutions when assessing the determinants and consequences of democratisation.

Date: 2015
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