CONTROL OF THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH QUASI‐MARKETS

Yoshiro Higano

Papers in Regional Science, 1987, vol. 63, issue 1, 43-58

Abstract: ABSTRACT In this paper, we discuss an indirect mechanism which corresponds to the Vickrey auction and Clarke tax mechanisms. A message is sent to the central agency through parameterization of the valuation function. Namely, strategy spaces are parameter spaces of a certain Function through which the economic agent intends to inform the central agency of the valuation function. We also discuss the optimal control of pollution emissions, abatement activity and the quality level of the environment through the instrument of quasi‐markets.

Date: 1987
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-5597.1987.tb01082.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:presci:v:63:y:1987:i:1:p:43-58

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