MYOPIC SPATIAL COMPETITION: BOUNDARY EFFECTS AND NETWORK SOLUTIONS

Gordon Mulligan ()

Papers in Regional Science, 1996, vol. 75, issue 2, 155-176

Abstract: ABSTRACT Recent findings suggest that spatial competition studies should focus more on markets having numerous firms and realistic topologies. Eventually clarification is needed of the existence conditions and properties of multi‐firm equilibria in network markets. This paper uses a traditional conjectures approach to examine long‐run equilibria in a variety of one‐dimensional markets. In all cases consumer demand is perfectly inelastic, price conjectures are exogenous, and (interior) firms show maximum locational differentiation. The attitude of firms is always myopic and never strategic, however. In a linear market the analysis discloses that firm price depends upon price in the counterpart circular market, a boundary effect, the spatial aggression of exterior firms, and the location of the firm. In a network market the analysis discloses that multiple equilibria occur and that the existence conditions for these equilibria depend upon both the geometric properties of the network and the price conjectures of the firms.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-5597.1996.tb00659.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:presci:v:75:y:1996:i:2:p:155-176

Access Statistics for this article

Papers in Regional Science is currently edited by Jouke van Dijk

More articles in Papers in Regional Science from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().