Bargaining power of landlords and underdevelopment in a system of cities*

Yasuhiro Sato

Papers in Regional Science, 2005, vol. 84, issue 2, 239-250

Abstract: Abstract. We consider two models of a system of cities in which landlords have some power in negotiating rental prices at which land is rented to develop cities. Analysis shows that the equilibrium city size is smaller than the optimal city size in a model in which city sizes are controlled by development companies or by local governments. Furthermore, it is shown that the equilibrium city size tends to be either smaller or larger than the optimal city size in a model in which city sizes are not controlled. These results confirm the possibility of underdevelopment of cities.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-5957.2005.00015.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:presci:v:84:y:2005:i:2:p:239-250

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