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Efficient tournaments within teams

Alex Gershkov, Jianpei Li and Paul Schweinzer

RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 40, issue 1, 103-119

Abstract: We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first‐best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00057.x

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