Negotiating contract types and contract clauses in the German construction industry during the Third Reich

Jochen Streb

RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 40, issue 2, 364-379

Abstract: This article examines the determinants of contractual form and renegotiations in the German construction industry during the Third Reich. At the beginning of World War II, firms dealt with growing uncertainty by convincing procurement agencies either to use cost‐plus contracts or to include an additional risk premium in fixed‐price contracts. In the later years of the war, procurement agencies initiated renegotiations over contract clauses to reduce the extraordinary profits resulting from information rents and high‐risk premiums. This regulatory course undermined the credibility of the regulatory commitment, thereby weakening the incentives of the fixed‐price contracts still in use.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00069.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:364-379

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