The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria

Andrew Sweeting

RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 40, issue 4, 710-742

Abstract: Commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that stations' incentives are at least partially aligned with the interests of advertisers, although equilibrium coordination is far from perfect. Coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours, when more listeners switch stations, and in smaller markets.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00086.x

Related works:
Working Paper: The Strategic Timing Incentives of Commercial Radio Stations: An Empirical Analysis Using Multiple Equilibria (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:4:p:710-742

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0741-6261

Access Statistics for this article

RAND Journal of Economics is currently edited by James Hosek

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from RAND Corporation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().