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On the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price in a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction within the common-value paradigm

Han Hong, Harry Paarsch and Pai Xu

RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 44, issue 4, 664-685

Abstract: type="main">

Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the common-value paradigm, we analyze the behavior of the transaction price as the numbers of bidders and units gets large in a particular way. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to the true, but ex ante unknown, value. Subsequently, we demonstrate that the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price is Gaussian. Finally, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China.

Date: 2013
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm (2010) Downloads
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