On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices
Philippe Jehiel () and
Laurent Lamy
RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 46, issue 2, 241-270
Abstract:
type="main">
From a theory viewpoint, the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices, also called absolute auctions, or of auctions with secret reserve prices, is somewhat puzzling despite being common. By allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret, we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge. We also analyze how buyers with various sophistications and sellers with various costs sort into the different formats, thereby offering a range of testable predictions. Alternative approaches are reviewed.
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1756-2171.12085 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices (2015)
Working Paper: On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices (2015)
Working Paper: On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices (2014) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:46:y:2015:i:2:p:241-270
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0741-6261
Access Statistics for this article
RAND Journal of Economics is currently edited by James Hosek
More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from RAND Corporation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().