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Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information

Shiming Fu and R. Vijay Krishna

RAND Journal of Economics, 2019, vol. 50, issue 2, 418-452

Abstract: We study a dynamic agency model where the agent privately observes the firm's cash flows that are subject to persistent shocks. We characterize the policy dynamics and implement the optimal contract by financial securities. Because bad performance distorts investors' beliefs downward, the agent has less incentive to misrepresent information. The agent's compensation is less than what he can divert and is convex in performance. As private information becomes more persistent, (i) the agent is compensated more by stock options; (ii) firm credit limits vary more with history, dropping after bad performance; (iii) the firm is financially constrained for longer time.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12275

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