Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation

Jesse Bull () and Joel Watson

RAND Journal of Economics, 2019, vol. 50, issue 4, 974-1003

Abstract: We propose a new model of disclosure, interpretation, and management of hard evidence in the context of litigation and similar applications. A litigant has private information and may also possess hard evidence that can be disclosed to a fact‐finder, who interprets the evidence and decides a finding in the case. We identify conditions under which hard evidence generates value that is robust to the scope of rational reasoning and behavior. These fail if the litigant's private information is sufficiently strong relative to the “face‐value signal” of evidence, and then hard evidence may be misleading. Rules that exclude some relevant hard evidence can be justified.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12302

Related works:
Working Paper: Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation (2019)
Working Paper: Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:50:y:2019:i:4:p:974-1003

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0741-6261

Access Statistics for this article

RAND Journal of Economics is currently edited by James Hosek

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from RAND Corporation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().