Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information

David Rietzke () and Yu Chen

RAND Journal of Economics, 2020, vol. 51, issue 1, 301-317

Abstract: We study a principal‐agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade‐offs between high‐ and low‐powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.

Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12314

Related works:
Working Paper: Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information (2018)
Working Paper: Push or pull? Performance pay, incentives, and information (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:1:p:301-317

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