Who fares better in teamwork?

Huseyin Yildirim

RAND Journal of Economics, 2023, vol. 54, issue 2, 299-324

Abstract: This article establishes a tenuous link between ability and relative well‐being in teamwork. It shows that higher‐ability or lower‐cost members can easily fare worse than their lower‐ability counterparts due to free‐riding. The extent of free‐riding hinges crucially on log‐concavity of effort cost, which its convexity restricts little. The article further shows how to compose teams that allocate effort efficiently and equalize payoffs in equilibrium. Efficient teams must have sufficiently diverse abilities and sizes at most the number of cost log‐inflections plus one. These findings can explain the evidence of a significant dislike for teamwork in the workplace and classroom.

Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12438

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:54:y:2023:i:2:p:299-324

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0741-6261

Access Statistics for this article

RAND Journal of Economics is currently edited by James Hosek

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from RAND Corporation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().