Equilibrium uniqueness in entry games with private information
José‐Antonio Espín‐Sánchez,
Alvaro Parra and
Yuzhou Wang
RAND Journal of Economics, 2023, vol. 54, issue 3, 512-540
Abstract:
We study equilibria in static entry games with single‐dimensional private information. Our framework embeds many models commonly used in applied work, allowing for firm heterogeneity and selective entry. We introduce the notion of strength, which summarizes a firm's ability to endure competition. In environments of applied interest, an equilibrium in which entry strategies are ordered according to the firms' strengths always exists. We call this equilibrium herculean. We derive simple and testable sufficient conditions guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness and, consequently, a unique counterfactual prediction.
Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12449
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Working Paper: Equilibrium Uniqueness in Entry Games with Private Information (2021) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:54:y:2023:i:3:p:512-540
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