Efficient resolution of partnership disputes

Daniel Fershtman, Béla Szabadi and Cédric Wasser

RAND Journal of Economics, 2023, vol. 54, issue 4, 543-569

Abstract: We study efficient resolution of partnership disputes in which, departing from the partnership dissolution literature, dissolution need not be efficient. We characterize which disputes can be resolved efficiently under both one‐ and two‐sided private information, and show that unless a partnership is sufficiently ineffective, efficient resolution is impossible. We propose simple dispute‐resolution procedures implementing the efficient outcome whenever possible. Finally, we characterize second‐best mechanisms when efficient resolution is impossible and private information is one sided.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12450

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