Manipulative Disclosure

Claudio Mezzetti

RAND Journal of Economics, 2025, vol. 56, issue 2, 184-193

Abstract: This article studies the verifiable disclosure of data by an informed expert whose bias direction is unknown to the decision maker. It shows that the expert's disclosure induces the decision maker to choose an action biased in the expert's desired direction. The pattern of manipulation depends on the weighted mass of left and right‐biased expert types with the same ideal action. All expert types with bias on the side with lower weighted mass, and a subset of types with bias on the other side, induce the choice of their ideal action; they fully manipulate. All other expert types partially manipulate.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12497

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:56:y:2025:i:2:p:184-193

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