Aid and the Delegated Fight Against Terrorism

Jean-Paul Azam () and Alexandra Delacroix

Review of Development Economics, 2006, vol. 10, issue 2, 330-344

Abstract: A positive empirical relationship is found between the level of foreign aid received by a country and the number of terrorist attacks originating from it. A simple model is used to explain it, where the donor delegates some actions against terrorism to the aid‐recipient government. Aid is endogenous in an econometric equation explaining participation in terrorist events, as expected from the model, and an attacks‐supply curve in which aid has a negative impact is presented at the end.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00321.x

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Working Paper: Aid and the Delegated Fight against Terrorism (2005)
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