Optimal Commodity Taxation with a Representative Agent

Murray Kemp and Koji Shimomura

Review of Development Economics, 2007, vol. 11, issue 2, 385-389

Abstract: It is argued that the task of describing the optimal vector of commodity taxes is trivialized by the traditional assumption of a price‐taking representative agent; that, in particular, the assumption of a representative agent ensures that the null vector is optimal.

Date: 2007
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