Monopsony and Time–Consistency: Sustainable Pricing Policies for Perennial Crops

Timothy Besley

Review of Development Economics, 1997, vol. 1, issue 1, 57-70

Abstract: Since farmers in developing countries must make sunk investments to produce perennial crops, governments, in the guise of state‐run marketing boards, face constraints on maximal sustinable price which can be charged by a marketing board assuming that “punishments” involve reversion to subsistence by untrusting farmers. This maximal price balances concerns about revenue extraction against the incentive of governments to cheat by capitalizing on sunk investments.

Date: 1997
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9361.00005

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Working Paper: Monopsony and Time-Consistency: Sustainable Pricing Policies for Perennial Grops (1992)
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