 Specialization, Information, and Growth: A Sequential Equilibrium AnalysisYew-Kwang Ng () and Xiaokai Yang Review of Development Economics, 1997, vol. 1, issue 3, 257-274 Abstract: Pricing costs and information problems are introduced into a framework with consumer‐producers, economies of specialization, and transaction costs, to predict the endogenous and concurrent evolution of the division of labor and of information concerning economic organization acquired by society. Concurrent evolution generates endogenous growth based on the tradeoff between gains from information about the efficient pattern of the division of labor—which can be acquired via experiments with various patterns—and experimentation costs, which relate to the costs of discovering prices. The concept of Walras sequential equilibrium is developed to analyze the social learning process which is characterized by uncertainties in the direction of the evolution and by a certain trend of the evolutionary process. Date: 1997 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:1:y:1997:i:3:p:257-274 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Review of Development Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi More articles in Review of Development Economics from Wiley Blackwell |
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