 Labor policy and multinational firms: The “race to the bottom” revisitedAnindya Bhattacharya and Debapriya Sen Review of Development Economics, 2021, vol. 25, issue 3, 1515-1537 Abstract: This paper revisits the “race to the bottom” phenomenon in a simple game theoretic framework. We consider one multinational firm, which requires two inputs that are imperfect substitutes, and two countries. In the benchmark model the labor of each country specializes in a distinct input. Seeking to maximize their labor incomes, countries simultaneously announce wages after which the firm chooses its labor employment in each country. We show that “race to the bottom” (countries setting minimum possible wages) is never an equilibrium. Moreover there are equilibria with “race to the top,” that is, countries set maximum possible wages. This result is robust in an extended model where prior to competing in wages, each country can make input‐specific investments to make its labor available for one or both inputs. Provided the production function of the firm is not asymmetrically intensive in either one of the two inputs, there are equilibria of the extended game with specialization (i.e., countries invest in distinct inputs) as well as “race to the top.” Date: 2021 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:25:y:2021:i:3:p:1515-1537 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Review of Development Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi More articles in Review of Development Economics from Wiley Blackwell |
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