To obey or not to obey? Can game theory explain human behavior in the context of coronavirus disease?

Yuval Arbel, Yifat Arbel, Amichai Kerner and Miryam Kerner

Review of Development Economics, 2023, vol. 27, issue 2, 1078-1091

Abstract: The objective of the current study is to explain noncompliance to social distancing rules in Western societies in the absence of a stringent law enforcement mechanism and vaccines. In the first part of the analysis, an evolutionary game theory mechanism of two players is developed. The theoretical model assumes the existence of the prisoner's dilemma due to personal inconveniences associated with mask wearing, hand washing, and lockdowns. The model demonstrates that in the absence of sufficient law enforcement mechanism, and regardless of the initial strategy undertaken, one of the three potential equilibria solutions is the convergence of the system to defection of both players. In the second part of the analysis, based on the freedom‐house measures, we provide empirical evidence supporting the notion that law enforcement efficiency is higher in autocratic countries. We show the perseverance of higher projected infection rates per 100,000 persons in democratic countries even 8 months after the outbreak of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Given the well‐known inclination to cooperate more often than expected by game theory, this real‐life outcome of noncompliance is remarkable. Moreover, the recent protests against lockdowns in China might reflect a shift from one equilibrium point (cooperation) to another (noncompliance).

Date: 2023
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